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EVIDENCE
THE SPOUSAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE AFTER
TRAMMEL v UNITED STA TES
INTRODUCTION
On March 10, 1976, Otis Trammel, Jr., was indicted, along with two
others, in the Federal District Court for the District of Colorado for import-
ing heroin into the United States from Thailand and the Philippine Islands,I
and for conspiracy to import heroin.' The indictment also named six per-
sons as unindicted coconspirators, including the defendant's wife, Elizabeth
Ann Trammel. When Elizabeth Trammel was granted "use" immunity in
exchange for her testimony, 3 Otis Trammel moved to sever his case from the
other two defendants. 4 He claimed that he would be prejudiced in a joint
trial as the government was planning to call his wife as a witness. Otis
Trammel asserted that he had not waived his privilege to bar adverse
spousal testimony. 5 The trial court denied Trammel's motion to sever, stat-
ing that since the wife's testimony did not concern confidential communica-
tions, the spousal testimonial privilege was not available.
6
Elizabeth Trammel testified extensively at the trial and, based exclu-
sively on this testimony, Otis Trammel was convicted as charged.7 The
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a split decision, upheld the ruling of the
trial court, concluding that the spousal testimonial privilege did not pre-
clude "the voluntary testimony of a spouse who appears as an unindicted
coconspirator under a grant of immunity from the Government."8
The Supreme Court granted certiorari9 to reconsider Hawkihs v. United
States,10 a case in which the High Court's pronouncement on the spousal
testimonial privilege conflicted with the Tenth Circuit's holding in Trammel.
The Court affirmed Trammel's conviction, not on the grounds espoused by
the court of appeals, but on the same rationale that it had rejected twenty-
two years earlier in Hawkins. The Court in Trammel modified the spousal
testimonial privilege so that today the witness spouse alone has the privilege
1. 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) (1976) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976). Use immunity precludes the use of testimony or other
compelled information, or the use of any information derived from such testimony or other
compelled information, in a criminal prosecution of the witness. Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. 441, 453 (1972). Transactional immunity, in contrast, accords full immunity to the
witness from prosecution for the offense to which the compelled testimony relates. Id.
4. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
5. Id.
6. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 28, Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980)
(Hearing on Motion to Sever).
7. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 43 (1980).
8. United States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166, 1168 (10th Cir. 1978).
9. Trammel v. United States, 440 U.S. 934 (1979).
10. 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
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to refuse to give adverse testimony." In so doing, the Court completed a
400-year evolution of the privilege. It brought the privilege into conform-
ance with other testimonial privileges and struck a better balance between
the social value of preserving marital harmony and the public's right to
every person's evidence.
This comment will examine the evolution of the spousal testimonial
privilege and its modification by the Court in Trammel. An analysis and
critique of the factors relied upon by the Court in striking the new balance
between the competing interests will follow. The comment will conclude
with an examination of a major problem tlie courts will encounter in at-
tempting to apply the Trammel version of the spousal testimonial privilege.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE MARITAL PRIVILEGE
A. Origins ofthe Privmlege
The history of the spousal testimonial privilege is shrouded in "tanta-
lizing obscurity."' 2 There is no certain record as to the precise time of its
origin or as to the thought process by which it evolved.' 3 The earliest re-
ported case in which the privilege was explicitly stated is Bent v. Allot,' 4 an
1580 decision wherein the accused was allowed to prevent his spouse from
testifying against him. The court, however, held that this privilege would be
waived if the defendant permitted his spouse to take the stand to testify fa-
vorably.' 5
By the time of Coke's Commentarie Upon Littleton, '6 in 1628, the testimo-
nial privilege had evolved into two complementary rules. The English
courts were holding that a witness was both incompetent to testify in favor of
a spouse and was privileged not to testify adversely. ' 7 The spousal incompe-
tency rule was based upon the rationale that favorable spousal testimony
was not trustworthy due to the common interests of a husband and wife who
were considered but "two souls in one flesh."' 18
During the mid-1800's,19 the spousal incompetency rule was statutorily
abolished in most states when common interest was no longer considered a
basis for disqualification. 20 These statutes, however, either expressly, or by
judicial interpretation, retained a privilege for confidential communica-
tions. 2 ' Unlike the broad spousal testimonial privilege, this testimonial priv-
ilege extends only to confidential communicatzons between husband and wife
11. 445 U.S. at 53.
12. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2227, at 211 (McNaughton
rev. 1961).
13. Id.
14. 21 Eng. Rep. 50 (Ch. 1580).
15. Id.
16. L. COKE, A COMMENTARIE UPON LrrTLETON 6b (1628).
17. Note, Marital Testimony and Communication Pnvileges. Improvements and Uncertainttes in the
Courts, 9 U. CAL. D. L. REV. 569, 570 (1976).
18. L. COKE, supra note 16, quoted in J. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2227, at 212.
19. This abolition did not occur in the federal courts until Funk v. United States, 290 U.S.
371 (1933).




during the marriage and can be invoked even after death 22 or divorce.23 The
policy behind the confidential communications privilege is to promote the
free interchange of confidences necessary for mutual understanding and
trust. 24 There had been no need for a separate confidential communications
privilege until this time because such information had been adequately pro-
tected by the all-encompassing spousal incompetency or testimonial privi-
lege rules.
25
There are two major justifications proffered for the spousal testimonial
privilege. 26 The first justification is that the privilege fosters family harmony
and avoids the marital dissension which would allegedly result from the ad-
mission of adverse testimony. 2 7 This rationale was originated by Lord Coke
in 1628 and has become the leading modern day justification for the privi-
lege.28 The second reason advanced is that there is a natural repugnancy in
compelling a husband or wife to be the means of the other's condemnation.
29
These justifications have been criticized on the premise that the privilege
extends to marriages beyond salvation,30 while at the same time, it does not
extend to other family members whose testimony will be equally repug-
nant.3 1
Although the spousal testimonial privilege has been severely criti-
cized,32 it has survived, virtually intact, throughout the years. 33 It has been
22. Merlin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 180 F. Supp. 90, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
23. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954).
24. See Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934).
25. Id. See discussion in Note, The Husband- Wife Testimoial Privilege in the Federal Courts, 59
B.U.L. REV. 894, 896 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Testimonial Pr vlege].
26. Every current argument for the privilege had appeared in England by the early 1800's.
Unfortunately, these reasons usually confused the spousal testimonial privilege with the confi-
dential communications privilege or the spousal incompetency rule. Only the two reasons dis-
cussed in the text have any arguable merit. J. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2228, at 214-16.
27. Id.
28. In Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77 (1958), the Court stated that "such a
policy was necessary to foster family peace .... " This-rationale was also the basis for Judge
McKay's dissent in United States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166, 1173 (10th Cir. 1978).
29. Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 535 (1960) (Warren, C.J., dissenting); J. WIG-
MORE, supra note 12, § 2228, at 217; Brief for Respondent at 15 n. 10, Trammel v. United States,
445 U.S. 40 (1980).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 176 F.2d 564 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 891
(1949).
31. J. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2228, at 217 n.2. Forcing a child to testify against his
parents would be equally undesirable, yet the common law privilege does not extend, and never
has extended to any family members other than the spouse. Id.
32. Professor McCormick claims that the privilege is "an archaic survival of mystical reli-
gious dogma." C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 66, at 145 (2d ed.
1972). Dean Wigmore claimed that the privilege was "the merest anachronism in legal theory
and an indefensible obstruction to truth." J. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2228, at 221.
One of the earliest critics of the privilege was Jeremy Bentham who stated:
Let us . . . grant to every man a license to commit all sorts of wickedness, in the
presence and with the assistance of his wife: let us secure to every man in the bosom of
his family . . . a safe accomplice: let us make every man's house his castle; and . . .
let us convert that castle into a den of thieves.
5 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 332, 340 (1827), quoted in J. WIGMORE,
supra note 12, § 2228, at 218.
33. The spousal testimonial privilege is not absolute and has long been subject to excep-
tions. The privilege will not apply when the witness spouse is the victim of the crime, Wyatt v.
United States, 362 U.S. 525 (1960); or if the crime is against the spouse's property, Herman v.
United States, 220 F.2d 219, 226 (4th Cir. 1955); or if the crime is committed against the child
1981]
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retained in some form by a majority of the jurisdictions in the United States
today.34 The first indication that the privilege was not inviolable appeared
in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which declared that the appli-
cation of all privileges should be governed by common law principles "in
light of reason and experience. '35 Some federal courts began to question the
continuing viability of the privilege and used the "reason and experience"
guideline as a basis for its modification. 36 Other courts felt inclined to await
explicit guidance from the Supreme Court,
37 or Congress. 38
B. The Hawkins Preceden
In 1958, the Supreme Court appeared to settle the controversy in Haw-
kins v. United States.39 In Hawkins, the Court unequivocally reaffirmed the
applicability of the spousal testimonial privilege in federal courts. The
Court asserted that there was no reason why the privilege "based on the
persistent instincts of several centuries should now be abandoned. '40 The
Court in Hawkt)s stated that the value of the privilege in promoting marital
harmony "has never been unreasonable and is not now."'' 4  The Court, how-
ever, made no attempt to determine if this policy would be advanced by the
application of the privilege in the Hawkins case. Such a conclusion would
have been unlikely as it was questionable whether there was any harmony in
the Hawkins marriage to preserve.
42
The government, in Hawkins, did not argue for the abolition of the testi-
monial privilege, but simply urged its modification in light of "reason and
experience." The government maintained that the privilege should belong
solely to the witness spouse.43 This revision would permit the witness spouse
to waive the privilege and testify if he or she should so choose. The Court
explicitly rejected this argument, claiming that there was no valid distinc-
tion between "voluntary" and "compelled" testimony in this context. "The
basic reason the law has refused to pit wife against husband or husband
against wife in a trial . . . was a belief that such a policy was necessary to
of either spouse, United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362 (8th Cir. 1975); or if the marriage is
fraudulent, Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953).
34. See listing as to how each state treats the spousal testimonial privilege in Trammel v.
United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48-49 n.9 (1980).
35. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26, Pub. L. No. 76-675, ch. 445, 54 Stat. 688 (1940). This provision
was deleted when the Federal Rules of Evidence became effective on July 1, 1975. See FED. R.
GRIM. P. 26 and Amendment Notes, 18 U.S.C.A. (West 1975).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Yoder, 80 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1935).
37. Brunner v. United States, 168 F.2d 281, 283 (6th Cir. 1948).
38. United States v. Walker, 176 F.2d 564 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 891 (1949). See
discussion in Tesimonial Awitbege, supra note 25, at 898-99.
39. 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
40. Id. at 79. Justice Stewart, in his concurrence, was more skeptical. He stated that
"[s]urely 'reason and experience' require that we do more than indulge in mere assumptions,
perhaps naive assumptions, as to the importance of this ancient rule to the interests of domestic
tranquility." Id. at 81-82 (Stewart, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 77.
42. The defendant's wife, a prostitute, had been living apart from the accused for several
years, under an assumed name. At one point in his testimony, the defendant referred to Mrs.
Hawkins as his "ex-wife." Id. at 82 n.4 (Stewart, J., concurring).
43. Brief for Respondents, Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
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foster family peace . . . ."44 and family peace would be disturbed as much,
if not more so, by voluntary testimony. 45 The Court conceded that if one
spouse were willing to testify against the other, there was a strong indication
that the marriage was in disrepair. The Court went on to state, however,
that many broken homes could be salvaged "provided no unforgivable act
[was] done by either party."'46 In the Court's opinion, adverse testimony,
either voluntary or compelled, would constitute such an "unforgivable act."
While the Court acknowledged that the rule was open to modification under
the "reason and experience" guideline, that guideline, in the Court's opin-
ion, did not justify granting the privilege solely to the testifying spouse.
4 7
C. Congressional Response
Fifteen years after Hawkins, Congress attempted to legislate a compro-
mise on the spousal testimonial privilege dispute in the proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence.48 Proposed rule 505 provided that the accused in a crim-
inal proceeding would have a privilege to prevent his spouse from testifying
against him, subject to certain exceptions. 49 -The Advisory Committee re-
jected the suggestion from the Department of Justice and Senator McClellan
that the testifying spouse be made the sole holder of the privilege. In the
Committee's judgment, "[t]he willingness of the testifying spouse is not . . .
complete support for the conclusion that the marriage is past saving since
there may be temporary pressures brought to bear."
50
Unaccountably, the proposed rules did not provide for a confidential
communications privilege. This absence caused a tremendous furor among
legal scholars because the confidential communications privilege, unlike the
spousal testimonial privilege, was generally accepted. One writer, criticizing
the proposed rules, claimed that Congress had "adopted the wrong form of
the wrong privilege, and [gave] it to the wrong spouse. "51
Rather than jeopardize the passage of the rest of the rules, Congress
substituted the current rule 501 which simply states that all testimonial priv-
ileges are to be "governed by the principles of the common law as they may
44. 358 U.S. at 77.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 78.
47. While Justice Stewart was more inclined to believe that "reason and experience" war-
ranted the requested change in the privilege, he felt that Hawkts was not the proper case for the
modification. There was a question as to the voluntariness of the wife's testimony. Id. at 82-83
(Stewart, J., concurring). See discussion in text accompanying notes 99-108, in/Ja.
48. 56 F.R.D. 183 (1973).
49. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 505, 56 F.R.D. 183, 244-47 (1973). The proposed privilege did
not apply to (1) crimes against the spouse or the children of either spouse, (2) matters occurring
prior to the marriage, or (3) proceedings in which the spouse is charged with importing aliens
for prostitution purposes in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1328 (1976), or with violation of the Mann
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (1976).
50. 2 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 505 [01], at 505-6 to 505-7 (1980). This was the principal
reason, given in a memorandum by Edward W. Cleary, Reporter for the Advisory Committee
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, for rejecting this suggestion. Rules of Evidence: Hearings on
Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the House
Comm. on theJudiiag, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 57-58 (1973).
5 1. M. Reutlinger, Poliey, Privac, and Prerogatives: A Criical Examination of the Proposed Federal
Rules of Evide ce as They Affect Marital Pnvilege, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1353, 1381 (1973).
1981]
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be interpreted by the courts . . . in the light of reason and experience."
52
The spousal testimonial privilege was thus left just where Congress had
found it-governed by "reason and experience" as defined on a case-by-case
basis.
53
The purpose of the proposed rules was to provide uniformity among the
federal courts. Rule 501, however, just as its predecessor in the federal crimi-
nal procedure rules, resulted in conflicting decisions. Courts utilized the rea-
son and experience guideline of rule 501 to carve out exceptions to the
privilege when both spouses jointly participated in a crime,
54 or when the
marriage at issue appeared to be fraudulent or beyond preservation.
55
These exceptions evidenced the reluctance of. the courts to impede the fact-
finding process by applying a testimonial privilege of questionable validity.
II. TRAMMEL V UNITED STATES
A. Procedural Histo.y
Trammel v. United States56 is a prime example of the creativity employed
by the courts to rationalize the admission of adverse spousal testimony over a
defendant's objection. In the Trammel case, the district court, the Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, and the United States Supreme Court all allowed
admission of the spouse's hostile testimony. Significantly, each court found
its own justification for so doing.
The district court apparently confused the spousal testimonial privilege
with the confidential communications privilege. The court adjudged that
the defendant Trammel could not prevent his wife from testifying about his
criminal activities because the information was deemed not to be confiden-
tial.57 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court and
held that the spouse's testimony was admissable, but for reasons other than
those advanced by the district court.5 8 The Tenth Circuit court held that
there is an exception to the spousal testimonial privilege when the witness
spouse is an unindicted coconspirator testifying under a grant of immu-
nity.59 The court of appeals further stated that the defendant's privilege did
not "override" his spouse's grant of immunity and, therefore, in light of reason
52. FED. R. EVID. 501.
53. See S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 7051, 7059; H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprhiedth [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7075, 7082; 120 CONG. REC. 40891 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Hungate).
54. United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393 "(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1091
(1974).
55. United States v. Cameron, 556 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Fisher, 518
F.2d 836 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975).
56. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
"57. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 28, Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980)
(transcript of hearing on defendant's motion for severence before Chief Judge Winner of the
Federal District Court for the District of Colorado).
58. 583 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1978). The court made it clear that the marital relationship
spawns two distinct privileges-the spousal testimonial privilege and the confidential communi-
cations privilege-and that only the former was involved in the instant case. Id. at 1171
(McKay, J., dissenting). For a further analysis of the Tenth Circuit's reasoning, see Overview,
Criminal Law and Procedure, Sixth Annual Tenth Circuit Suwey, 57 DEN. L.J. 229, 260 (1980).
59. 583 F.2d at 1168.
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and experience, her adverse testimony could properly be admitted.
60
The Supreme Court granted certiorari6 l to reconsider its decision in
Hawkins v. United States.62 The differing rationales of the district court and
of the court of appeals were indicative of the confusion and doubts which all
of the courts were experiencing in applying the spousal testimonial privilege.
Congress' attempt to legislate the privilege had failed 63 and the courts' ap-
plication of the "reason and experience" guideline was producing inconsis-
tent results. 64 The time was ripe for the Supreme Court to provide further
guidance.
B. The Government's Position
The government advanced two arguments in support of its position.
The United States urged the Court to affirm the decision of the court of
appeals and hold that the spousal testimonial privilege does not apply when
the husband and wife are joint participants in crime. 65 The government
claimed that the rehabilitating aspect of the marriage is lost when both wife
and husband are involved in a crime. The application of the privilege there-
fore would abuse the relationship it was designed to protect.66 The United
States asserted that an exception in this case was necessary in order to bring
the spousal testimonial privilege into conformance with other testimonial
privileges.
6 7
The second argument espoused by the government was the bold asser-
tion that the time had come to reconsider the Hawkins decision and award
the testimonial privilege solely to the witness spouse. 68 This contention ap-
parently surprised both the petitioner and the amicus curiae.69 While both of
these parties presented very cogent arguments as to why the exception relied
upon by the court of appeals should not be upheld, neither addressed the
government's second argument. This omission proved to be a crucial mis-
take.
60. Id. (emphasis added). Judge McKay severely criticized this rationale in his dissent,
stating that the immunity statutes are irrelevant and afford no basis for fashioning a new excep-
tion to the privilege. Id. at 1172 (McKay, J., dissenting).
61. 440 U.S. 934 (1979).
62. 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
63. See text accompanying notes 48-55, supra.
64. Compare United States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1978) with United States
v. Lilley, 581 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1978).
65. Brief for Respondents at 25-29, Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980). The
government did not argue that a grant of immunity had to be involved. The government felt
that the married couple's joint participation in a crime was sufficient to justify an exception to
the spousal testimonial privilege.
66. Id. at 26.
67. Joint participation in a crime creates an exception to the confidential communications
privilege, United States v. Mendoza, 574 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir.), cert. demnid, 439 U.S. 988 (1978);
and to the attorney-client privilege, Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) (dictum); In re
Doe, 551 F.2d 899, 901 (2d Cir. 1977); Hyde Constr. Co. v. Koehring Co., 455 F.2d 337, 342
(5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir.), cert. dnied, 404 U.S.
958 (1971); United States v. Hoffa, 349 F.2d 20, 37 (6th Cir. 1965).
68. Brief for Respondents at 16-25, Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
69. The Michigan Bar Association Standing Committee on Civil Procedure was granted
leave to file a brief as amicur cuniae. Trammel v. United States, 442 U.S. 939 (1979).
19811
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C. The Holdng i Trammel
The Supreme Court recognized that the government's supplemental ar-
gument, that the spousal testimonial privilege should belong to the testifying
spouse, had been expressly rejected in Hawkins. The Court, nevertheless,
claimed that the caveat in Hawkins,70 coupled with the language and the
congressional intent behind rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 71 con-
firmed its authority to reconsider the continucd vitality of the Hawkins rule
in light of "reason and experience."
72
As further justification for a reconsideration of Hawkins, the Court
pointed out that the trend in state law is toward divesting the accused of the
privilege to bar adverse spousal testimony. The number of jurisdictions that
recognize the privilege has decreased from thirty-one in 1958 to twenty-four
in 1980. 7 3 A conclusion regarding the trend in state law, however, would not
be accurate without an examination of the states' confidential communica-
tion statutes as well. These statutes are often broader in scope than the fed-
eral definition of "confidential communication."
7 4
Having found sufficient cause to reconsider Hawkins, the Court went on
to hold that
"reason and experience" no longer justify so sweeping a rule as that
found acceptable by the Court in Hawkins. Accordingly . . . the
existing rule should be modified so that the witness spouse alone
has a privilege to refuse to testify adversely; the witness may be
neither compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying. 
7 5
III. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S RATIONALE
A. Reason and Experience Re-examined
The Trammel Court modified the spousal testimonial privilege on the
pretext that it was no longer tenable in light of "reason and experience."
Specifically, the Court claimed that the spousal testimonial privilege was
broader in scope than the other testimonial privileges, that the ancient foun-
dations for the privilege had long since disappeared, and that the willingness
of one spouse to testify against the other was a reliable indication that the
marital relationship was in disrepair. As Justice Stewart cogently pointed
70. In Hawkins, the Court stated that "this decision does not foreclose whatever changes in
the rule [as] may eventually be dictated by 'reason and experience.'" 358 U.S. at 79.
71. Congress intended that Fed. R. Evid. 501 was to "provide the courts with the flexibility
to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis." 120 CONG. REc. 40891 (1974) (statement
of Rep. Hungate), quoted in Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980).
72. The petitioner claimed that the Court was without authority to reconsider Hawkins, as
28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1976) states that no rule "creating, abolishing, or modifying a privilege shall
have . . . force or effect unless . . . approved by act of Congress." The Court dismissed this
contention as inconsistent with the congressional intent behind Fed. R. Evid. 501. 445 U.S. at
47 n.8.
73. 445 U.S. at 48.
74. Many of the states' statutes regarding confidential communications are broad enough
in scope to allow the accused to exclude adverse spousal testimony which would not fall within
the federal definition of "confidential communication." See discussion in Testimonal nudWegr,
supra note 25, at 914-15.
75. 445 U.S. at 53.
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out in his concurrence, reason and experience had not changed since Haw-
krns. The Court simply accepted the argument it had rejected in 1958.76 An
examination of the majority's reasoning demonstrates the accuracy of Justice
Stewart's perception.
The Court claimed that the spousal testimonial privilege is in marked
contrast to all other testimonial privileges as it is not limited to confidential
communications. Instead, the spousal testimonial privilege permits the ac-
cused to exclude all adverse testimony. 77 While true, this distinction had not
developed since Hawkins was decided. 78 Furthermore, it is invalid to com-
pare the spousal testimonial privilege with testimonial privileges designed to
promote confidence and trust between the parties. The cultivation of confi-
dence and trust is not the primary purpose of the spousal testimonial privi-
lege, nor was it ever purported to be. The principal purpose of the spousal
testimonial privilege is to foster family harmony and to avoid the marital
dissension which would result from "pitting" one spouse against the other in
a trial. 79 To limit the spousal privilege to confidential communications
would not further the goal of family harmony, and would moreover render
the spousal privilege superfluous since confidential communications are in-
dependently privileged.8 0 Apparently, the Court was aware of the infirmity
of this comparison for, even after the Trammel modification, the privilege
extends to all adverse spousal testimony. The post- Trammel spousal testimo-
nial privilege encompasses adverse testimony relating to both actions and
confidential communications. The significant difference after Trammel is who
may invoke or waive the privilege.
The Court stated that the "ancient foundations for so sweeping a privi-
lege have long since disappeared."8' As Justice Stewart pointed out in his
concurrence, however, these foundations disappeared long before 1958 and
"this disappearance certainly did not occur in the few years that have
elapsed between the Hawkins decision and this one."'8 2 It is also questionable
whether the "ancient foundations" referred to by the Court ever pertained to
this particular privilege.-
8 3
The Court's final basis for modifying Hawkins was its conclusion that, if
one spouse is willing to testify against the other, there is a clear indication
that the relationship is in disrepair. The Court reasoned that there is thus
76. Id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 51.
78. This distinction has existed since the privilege was created some 400 years ago. To
state that this distinction makes a difference in light of "reason and experience" in 1980, but not
in 1958, overestimates the credulousness of the American public.
79. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77 (1958). See discussion in text accompanying
notes 26-31, supra.
80. The confidential communications privilege already excludes this information. The
Court made it clear that the confidential communications privilege was not at issue in the in-
stant case. 445 U.S. at 45 n.5.
81. Id. at 52.
82. Id. at 54 (Stewart, J., concurring).
83. The Court was referring to Lord Coke's statement that the husband and wife were but
two souls in one flesh." See text accompanying notes 16-18, supra. This early rationale, how-
ever, supported the spousal disqualification for incompetency rule, not the privilege of the ac-
cused to prevent adverse spousal testimony.
1981]
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very little marital harmony to be preserved by the privilege.84 In Hawkins v.
United States, the Court had stated that:
the Government argues that the fact a husband or wife testifies
against the other voluntarily is strong indication that the marriage
is already gone. Doubtless this is often true. But not all marital
flareups . . . are permanent. . . . [S]ome apparently broken
homes can be saved provided no unforgivable act is done by either
party. Adverse testimony given in criminal proceedings would, we
think, be likely to destroy almost any marriage.8 5
It is noteworthy that the Trammel Court repudiated this reasoning without
citation to the Hawkins decision.
A proper analysis of Trammel cannot be based upon the changing cir-
cumstances between 1958 and 1980. Any attempt to justify the Trammel de-
cision on the ground that "reason and experience" has evolved since the
Hawkins opinion was handed down will falter. The Trammel opinion is a de
novo analysis by the Supreme Court and the Court's rationale must be ex-
amined independently of Hawkins. As Justice Stewart stated, any attempt to
reconcile the Hawkins and Trammel opinions would be of "greater interest to
students of human psychology than to students of law."
86
B. Balancing of Interests
The Court in Trammel re-examined the balance between society's inter-
est in preserving marital harmony and the public's right to every man's evi-
dence. The Court prefaced this discussion by stating that every privilege
impedes the pursuit of justice and will be recognized only to the extent that
it promotes "a public good transcending the normally predominant princi-
ple of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining the truth.
'87
The importance of preserving marital harmony is generally accepted. 8
The criticism of the rule has usually centered on whether the spousal testi-
monial privilege, as it existed prior to Trammel, sufficiently promoted that
goal.89 Permitting the accused to invoke the privilege fostered abuse because
the privilege was often claimed when there was, in fact, no marital harmony
to preserve. Too often the privilege was claimed to protect the defendant
rather than the marriage. 9° Ironically, a prime example of this abuse was
demonstrated in Hawkins v. United States.9 1 In Hawkins, the Court upheld the
right of the accused to invoke the privilege even though the defendant's wife,
a prostitute, had been living apart from him for several years under an as-
84. 445 U.S. at 52.
85. 358 U.S. at 77-78.
86. 445 U.S. at 54 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart was paraphrasing a similar
sentiment of Justice Jackson, as stated in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 325 (1951).
87. 445 U.S. at 50 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960)).
88. Wigmore, however, claimed that the defendant's marital harmony should not be
placed above society's need for the truth. J. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2228, at 216-18.
89. See, e.g., Testimonial Pr vilege, supra note 25, at 912-15.
90. When Elizabeth Trammel was questioned whether divorce was contemplated, she tes-
tified that her husband had said that "I would go my way and he would go his." 445 U.S. at 42
n. 1. This does not comport with the theory that Otis Trammel was concerned with his marital
harmony.
91. 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
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sumed name. At one point in his testimony, the defendant had referred to
her as his "ex-wife."
'92
Aware of the privilege's abuses, the Supreme Court concluded that the
privilege, in its present form, did not sufficiently promote the goal of preserv-
ing marital harmony so as to justify its burden on society's need for proba-
tive evidence.9 3 Concluding that the spousal testimonial privilege was
inappropriate, the Court was presented with the problem of modifying the
privilege so as to allow more testimony into evidence while, at the same time,
still fostering family peace. There were three alternatives. The Court could
have: 1) abolished the privilege; 2) requested the courts to balance, in each
case, the need for the evidence against the possible adverse impact on the
marriage; or 3) awarded the privilege to the witness spouse alone.
94
Abolition of the privilege would involve the type of policy decision that
is properly left to the legislature. This approach was the one taken by all the
states which have modified or abolished the privilege. 95 The individual bal-
ancing approach would be too difficult to apply and conducive to the gener-
ation of conflicting results. 96 In addition, this approach would put the
defendant in the objectionable position of having to establish the "worth" of
his marriage before the privilege could be invoked.
The most viable alternative was to grant the testimonial privilege to the
witness spouse alone. This modification will enhance the opportunity for the
introduction of probative evidence into testimony, will avoid the onerous
judicial inquiry into the "worth" of a marriage, and will promote a uniform
application of the spousal testimonial privilege throughout the federal judi-
cial system. The advantages of this rule are substantial. Moreover, there is
no reason to suspect that family peace will be jeopardized by the Court's
empowering the witness spouse to decide whether he or she will testify. As
one commentator has stated,
if the rationale for the privilege is one of avoiding marital dissen-
sion, then the only spouse able to make a decision to testify on the
basis of whether the marriage is worth saving is the witness spouse;
the accused is understandably unlikely to be able to put aside his or
her strong personal interest in suppressing adverse testimony, and
would be likely to invoke the privilege regardless of marital consid-
erations.
9 7
The witness spouse is in a better position than either the accused or the court
to decide whether the marriage is worth saving and what effect, if any, ad-
verse testimony will have on the relationship. The Trammel modification also
minimizes society's "natural repugnancy" in witnessing the condemnation of
one spouse by the other. Society is less likely to be offended if the witness
92. Id. at 82 n.4 (Stewart, J., concurring).
93. 445 U.S. at 53.
94. See Testirwnia/ Pnivjlge, supra note 25, at 913-19, for a further discussion of the possible
alternatives.
95. Id. at 915.
96. Id. at 917. "Because the harm that might be caused to the marriage would be difficult
to show, while the need for evidence easy to show, any balancing would be illusory at best." Id.
97. M. Reutlinger, supra note 51, at 1384 (emphasis in original).
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spouse has voluntarily chosen to testify.98 A trial court should respect, there-
fore, any decision by the witness spouse to voluntarily testify. The key deter-
mination, however, is whether the testimony is indeed voluntary.
C. Delermznrng Voluntariness
The Court's reasoning in Trammel is based upon the assumption that the
witness spouse's testimony will be voluntary. If this is indeed the situation in
every case, the grant of the privilege solely to the witness spouse will result in
an ideal balance of the competing interests. If, however, a witness spouse is
pressured into testifying, the privilege will become an absurdity, as the mari-
tal relationship will be subject to the whim of the prosecutor. This possibil-
ity was recognized by Justice Stewart in Hawkins, wherein he stated that
such a rule [the witness spouse privilege] would be difficult to ad-
minister and easy to abuse. Seldom would it be a simple matter to
determine whether the spouse's testimony were really voluntary,
since there would often be ways to compel such testimony more
subtle than the simple issuance of a subpoena, but just as cogent.99
In Hawkins, the witness spouse had been imprisoned and was released under
a three thousand dollar bond. The bond, however, was conditioned upon
her appearance in court as a witness for the government. As Justice Stewart
observed, "these circumstances are hardly consistent with the theory that
[the witness'] testimony was voluntary."'0
The situation in the Trammel case was strikingly similar. Elizabeth
Trammel was given immunity on the condition that she testify against her
husband. 0 1 The government conceded that she would be in danger of los-
ing her freedom if she refused to testify. 102 When the witness spouse is
placed in a position where he or she must choose between the marriage and
freedom, it would be difficult for any trial court to conclude that the testi-
mony is voluntary. 10 3 The Court in Trammel summarily dismissed the vol-
untariness issue with the conclusory statement that the witness spouse's
testimony was not rendered involuntary by the fact that she chose to testify
only after a grant of immunity and assurances of lenient treatment.' 0 4 In
light of the circumstances, the voluntariness of Elizabeth Trammel's testi-
mony is highly suspect. The voluntariness issue certainly deserved a more
thorough analysis by the Court.
Notwithstanding this imperfection, the Court's Trammel decision is to be
commended. It is imperative, however, that the federal district courts adopt
precautions to ensure that the witness spouse's testimony is, in fact, volunta-
98. Id. at 1385.
99. 358 U.S. at 83 (Stewart, J., concurring).
100. Id.
101. 445 U.S. at 42.
102. The government, in its brief, stated that the invocation of the privilege by the accused
could place the witness in danger of losing her freedom. Brief for Respondent at 20-21, Tram-
mel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
103. This was the principle reason why the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
Evidence rejected the suggestion that the witness spouse be the sole holder of the privilege. See,
note 50 supra and accompanying text.
104. 445 U.S. at 53.
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rily given. An examination of the jurisdictions which have adopted the wit-
ness spouse privilege indicates that the states have been able to effectively
deal with this problem.10 5 The precautions generally followed by these juris-
dictions include the requirement that the trial judge make an independent
determination that the witness spouse is aware of the privilege not to testify,
and that the witness spouse has knowingly and voluntarily waived that privi-
lege. 1 0 6 This bench determination should be made outside of the presence of
the jury, 10 7 and neither party should be permitted to comment to the jury
regarding the invocation of the privilege. 108
Undoubtably, many occasions will arise where the witness spouse will
feel pressured to testify, for a variety of reasons. If the federal district courts
adopt precautions to ensure the voluntariness of testimony, both the marital
relationship and the rights of the accused should be adequately protected.
While the voluntariness of spousal testimony is a serious question, and de-
serves consideration more thorough than that afforded it by the Court in
Trammel, the voluntariness determination requirement is not a fatal flaw in
the Trammel modification of the spousal testimonial privilege.
CONCLUSION
The Court, in its Trammel decision, has completed a 400-year evolution
of the spousal testimonial privilege. By granting the privilege solely to the
witness spouse, the Court has struck a more equitable balance between soci-
ety's interest in preserving marital harmony, on the one hand, and the pub-
lic's right to every person's evidence, on the other. In addition, the Court
has silenced the major critics of the testimonial privilege who had argued
that a marriage in which one spouse is willing to testify against the other is
beyond salvation,' 0 9 and that the accused should not be "consulted in deter-
mining whether justice shall have its course against him."
' "10
As with most solutions, however, the Court has raised new problems.
Unless it can adequately be shown that the witness spouse's testimony is in-
deed voluntary, the spousal testimonial privilege will become a mere cha-
rade. The prosecutor, with his abilities to pressure a witness spouse, will be
in the position of deciding whether a particular marriage is "worthy" of the
privilege. The prosecutor's dominance is compounded when the husband
and wife have jointly participated in a crime. Through the use of
prosecutorial discretion and immunity, the government can put great pres-
105. See, e.g., Postom v. United States, 322 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
917 (1964); Taylor v. State, 25 Ala. App. 408, 147 So. 647 (1933); People v. Lankford, 55 Cal.
App. 3d 203, 127 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1976); People v. Marsh, 270 Cal. App. 2d 365, 75 Cal. Rptr.
814 (1969); Carroll v. State, 147 Ga. App. 332, 248 S.E.2d 702 (1978); Broome v. State, 141 Ga.
App. 538, 233 S.E.2d 883 (1977); Commonwealth v. Stokes, 374 N.E.2d 87 (Mass. 1978).
106. See, e.g., People v. Lankford, 55 Cal. App. 3d 203, 210, 127 Cal. Rptr. 408, 412 (1976);
Commonwealth v. Stokes, 374 N.E.2d 87, 96 n.9 (Mass. 1978).
107. Postom v. United States, 322 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denid, 376 U.S. 917
(1964); Broome v. State, 141 Ga. App. 538, 233 S.E.2d 883 (1977); Commonwealth v. Stokes,
374 N.E.2d 87 (Mass. 1978).
108. Holyfield v. State, 365 So. 2d 108 (Ala. App.), cert. dened, 365 So. 2d 112 (Ala. 1978).
109. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 32, § 66, at 145.
110. J. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2228, at 216-17.
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sure on one spouse to testify against the other. Although this problem raises
serious complications for trial courts, it can effectively be dealt with if the
courts take precautionary measures to ensure the voluntariness of testimony.
The courts have successfully dealt with the voluntariness determination in
other areas."' There is no reason to believe that the courts will have any
more difficulty in determining the voluntariness of spousal testimony.
Dennis C Keeler
111. Voluntariness requires an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
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